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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Bus TRANSPORTATION FOR PUPILS OF SECTARIAN SCHOOLS.-
An amendment to the New York Education Law' provided for free bus transportation
of pupils to and from sectarian schools 2 whenever bus transportation was furnished
the pupils of public schools. The constitutionality of the law was raised by a
taxpayer's action to restiain the Board of Education of Hempstead from furnishing
the transportation. On appeal from a judgment dismissing the complaint, held, three
judges dissenting,3 the statute authorizing free transportation for pupils of denomina-
tional schools was an aid to such schools and unconstitutional.4 Judgment reversed.
Judd et al. v. Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 2, Toun of
Hempstead, Nassau County, et al. (Bennett, Att'y Gen. et al., Interveners), 278
N. Y. 200, 15 N. E. (2d) 576 (1938).
While New York, as most states, in conformity with the well established principle
of separation of the Church and the State, has long unequivocally indicated that
there must be no aid to sectarian or denominational schools from public money,5
these holdings do not appear to be conclusive of the question of bus transportation
for the pupils of such schools. This question is a rather late development. It seems
that the demand for bus transportation for public school children was a direct result
of the fairly recent mergers of several district schools into one consolidated school,
sometimes more remote from the home of the student.0 Provisions that all pupils
of school age should be afforded transportation facilities whether they attended the
free common school or not came in the form of amendments to existing statutes.
We must bear this in mind because in many instances it has been urged upon the
courts that a statute providing for free bus transportation for children attending
parochial schools was a valid exercise of police power of the state. The theory is
that since the highways are extremely dangerous, especially to children, buses were
provided in an effort to protect all children from this known danger as a valid exer-
cise of police power. If this be so any advantage received by the parochial schools
would be incidental and immaterial.1 Indeed this was the very ground upon which
1. N. Y. EDUCATION LAW § 206, as amended, LAws oF 1936, c. 541, in effect Sept. 1, 1936.
2. It was admitted in this, and the other cases cited, that the schools in question were
denominational sectarian schools.
3. The justice in Special Term who dismissed the complaint was unanimously supported
by the five justices in the Appellate Division and by the three dissenting judges in the
Court of Appeals. In the last court, four judges made up the majority. Thus It appeared
that a total of nine judges voted in favor of the constitutionality of the free bus legis-
lation and four judges voted against it. Cf. a similar judicial count of judges for tile
purpose of criticising the majority opinion in Children's Hospital v. Adkins, 261 U. S. 525
(1923); Powell, Judiciality of Minimum Wage Legislation (1924) 37 HARv. L. R v. 545, $49.
4. N. Y. CONST. Art. 9 § 4 which reads "Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof,
shall use its property or credit or any public money, or authorize or permit either to be used,
directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance, other than for examination or inspection, of
any school or institution of learning wholly or in part under the control or direction of any
religious denomination, or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught."
5. People ex rel. R. C. Orphan Asylum in City of Brooklyn v. Board of Ed. City of
Brooklyn, 13 Barb. 400 (N. Y. 1851); see Williams v. Board of Trustees Stanton Common
School District, 173 Ky. 708, 191 S. W. 507 (1917) for a well reasoned case.
6. Before the 1937 amendment the Maryland law read "The county board of education
shall consolidate schools whenever in their judgment it is practical, and arrange, when
possible without charge to the county, and shall pay when necessary for the transportation
of pupils to and from such consolidated schools." MD. ANN. CODE (Bagley, 1924) Art. 77,
Sec. 50. See also 8 N. Y. EDUCATION LAW § 206 as amended, LAws or 1936, c. 547, In effect
Sept. 1, 1936.
7. See (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 935 in support of this view.
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the Supreme Court of Maryland relied in deciding that a similar statute? was con-
stitutional.
It has also been argued, unsuccessfully, when this question and the analogous ques-
tion of furnishing free text books directly to the pupils of sectarian schools arose, that
the aid furnished is a direct aid to the pupils and not an aid to the scbool' 0 Such a
contention was adopted in Borden v. La. St. Board of Ed." This reasoning' s has been
criticized on the ground that it would lead to an ever-widening class of grants in aid
of sectarian school pupils.' 3 However, there are substantial grounds, for considering
that the aid is given directly to the pupil and not to the school in either the text
book or bus cases. The argument 14 is most soundly stated when it is said that such
statutes are an aid to children in their compliance with the compulsory education
law.' 5 All states recognize the right of parents to send their children for instruction
to schools other than public schools.' 6 But the state exercises its control over edu-
cation and compels attendance of all children between certain ages, whether they
attend public or private schools. It cannot well be urged that the transportation of
a school child is any more an aid to the educational institution which he attends
than the bottle of milk or clothing furnished17 him to help him comply with the laws
S. Board of Education of Baltimore County v. Wheat, 199 Atl. 628 (Ald. 193S).
9. § 142 A, 146 B CODL or Pu c TOCATL.ws or B.Lr.v.xOas Cotn.,w. The Maryland
Declaration of Rights does not specifically prohibit "indirect" aid to s-ctarian schools.
MD. ANN'. CoDE, (Bagley, 1924) DEmcAO.aao, or RionTr, art. 36. An appropriation hoy:-
ever, may not accomplish indirectly what it is forbidden to accomplish directly.
10. State v. Milquet, 180 Wis. 109, 192 N. W. 392 (1923) (bus transportation); State
ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 6 W. W. Harrington 181, 172 At. 835 (Del. 1934) (bus trans-
portation); Smith v. Donahue, 202 App. Div. 656, 195 N. Y. Supp. 715 (2d Dep't 1922)
(textbooks); M=r. REP. or A=Tr. Gnu. (1920) 300.
11. Borden v. La. State Board of Education, 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929). This
view seems to be adopted also by the Atty. Gen. of New Hampshire. In an opinion (not
yet officially reported) on the constitutionality of a 1937 amendment to the Nsv: Hwr,-
smn EDurC %Txoz LAw he says "... Our constitutional limitation ... relates to aid to such
schools and institutions as distinguished from the pupils thereof and does not in any way
prohibit aid to a pupil getting to and from school."
It is well to note that the often cited case of Cochran v. La. State Board of Education,
281 U. S. 370 (1930) is no authority for the proposition that the United States Supreme
Court has decided that free bus transportation or text books are constitutionally permitted.
This case stands only for the proposition that the decision on the constitutionality of the
Louisiana statute was a matter for the state court alone and that the statute as construed
by the Louisiana state court was not in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution.
12. "One may scan the acts in vain to ascertain where any money is appropriated for
the purchase of school books for the use of any church, private, sectarian or even public
schools. The appropriations were made for the specific purpose of purchasing school
books for the use of school children of the state, free of cost to them." Borden v. La.
State Bd. of Ed., 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929).
13. See (1930) 25 ILL. LAv R m. 547.
14. This is the argument of the dissenting opinion in the principal case. It is interesting
to note that this opinion of Judge Crane and the concurring opinion of Judge Sloan
in the Maryland case have adopted identical reasoning in cases decided only four days apart.
15. N. Y. EDucAmox LAW (1929) § 627.
16. Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 263 U. S.
510 (1924).
17. N. Y. EDuCATO, LAW (1929) § 627 f, provides: "Public welfare officials except as
otherwise provided by law, shall furnish indigent children with suitable clothing, shoes,
193S]
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laid down by the states requiring education. The institution must be considered as
aided only incidentally.
In the few states' s where this question has been brought before the courts, the
courts, with the single exception of Maryland have held, with the instant case, that
bus transportation was an aid to the sectarian schools and unconstitutional under
the provisions providing for separation of Church and State. In this the courts have
but followed the previous strict construction of such provisions.
The weight of case authority and the broad terms of the constitutional pro-
hibition against direct or indirect aid to private schools may be urged for the
soundness of the instant case. But the minority opinion persuasively establishes
that the object of the legislation permitting the use of bus transportation by pupils
of public or private schools was to insure the attendance of children at their respec-
tive schools, and that there is no benefit to the schools except accidentally. Indeed,
the enlarged enrolment possibly resulting from bus transportation may increase the
financial burden of those private schools, such as parochial schools, where no tuition
is charged. The ambiguity of the constitutional clause and the inequality of
treatment arising therefrom as well as the conflict of judicial opinion10 can, and
should be, removed by constitutional amendment 20
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POWER or FEDERAL COURTS IN MATTERS OF DIvERSITY OF
CITIZENSHIP-MAY NOT DISREGARD STATE DECISIONs.--Tompkins, a citizen of Penn-
sylvania, was injured by a train owned by the Erie R. R., a New York corporation.
The accident occurred in Pennsylvania. The law of that state at the time was not
definitely decided, but it seemed that the injured man would have been a trespasser,
while in the federal courts the rule was more favorable. The plaintiff brought his
action in the federal court on the ground of diversity of citizenship.1 Recovery was
allowed by the trial court and affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals on the
ground that the federal common law governed. They declined to decide the issue
of state law. On appeal from the Circuit Court of Appeals to the United States
Supreme Court, held, two justices dissenting, that whenever the federal courts exer-
cise jurisdiction on the grounds of diversity of citizenship they must apply the
written and unwritten law of the state in which the controversy arose. Eie R. R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).
In the instant decision, Swift v. Tyson,- one of the best known and one of the
books, food and other necessaries to enable them to attend upon instruction as hereinbefore
required by law."
18. See note 10, supra.
19. See note 3, supra.
20. It is submitted that the action of the New York State Constitutional Convention
in providing in its proposed draft of the new constitution for the legalization of free bus
transportation is to be commended. Considering the great benefit derived by the state and
by the taxpayers from the parochial and private school system, and the enormous savings
accomplished by it, the permission granted by the state to its young citizens attending
sectarian schools to ride along with their fellow play mates is little enough return. The
questions of justice and fair play which were not before the court in the instant case, are
now properly before the voters. It is hoped that this constitutional provision will receive
the indorsement of the electorate. Proposed N. Y. CotqsT. art. XI, § 4.
1. "The judicial power shall extend to all cases .. . between citizens of different
states.. .. " U. S. CoNsr. Art. III § 2. This section was intended to enable non-residents
of a state to have their day in court free from local prejudices.
2. 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842). In this case the court was concerned with the issue of
whether a pre-existing debt was consideration on a bill of exchange. The New York
[Vol. 7
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most important cases ever decided by the United States Supreme Court has been
liquidated by its creators.3 The basis for the ruling of that famous case was Mr.
Justice Story's 4 contention that Section 34 of the Judiciary ActS providing that the
"laws of the several states ... shall be regarded as rules of decision" (in the fed-
eral courts) did not include judicial decisions of the state courts on matters of
common law,0 but merely extended to state statutes and to the right or title to things
of a permanent nature. It was also believed that such freedom of judicial decision
in the federal courts would provide the litigants with an impartial tribunal and make
for uniformity of law.7
Throughout the long existence of the doctrine of the Tyson case, it was both ably
attacked8 and well defendedY Mr. Justice Brandeis in the instant case particularly
stressed the research of Professor Warren which contended that Mr. Justice Story
was in error in concluding that Section 34 did not extend to unwritten law.?0 His
courts held it was not. Mr. Justice Story speaking for the Supreme Court hold contra
to the New York courts.
3. The importance of the instant case was not noticed for one week until Arthur
Krock devoted two columns to a discussion of it. Krock, In the Nation, N. Y. Times,
May 3, 1938, p. 22, col. 5 and May 4, 1938, p. 22, col. 5. See also NEw Rr'ruL.c, May
11, 1938, p. 1, col. 1; NzwswxE , May 16, 1938, p. 33, col. 1.
4. One prominent writer places the cause which led to the Tyson case in the personality
of its author. Mr. Justice Story at the time was writing a text on negotiable instru-
ments law and so would be expected to dogmatize on the subject. GRAY, Tm N,%rmUn A,.D
SouFRcEs oF TH LAw (2d ed. 1921) 253.
5. 23 U. S. C. A. § 725 (1789).
6. "General common law" included non-statutory commercial law, insurance, contracts,
torts, agency, and damages. Schmidt, Substantive Law Applied by the Federal Courts-
Effect of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins (1938) 16 TFx. L. RE:v. 512, 516. See Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 76, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 821 (1933) where the court indicates that
state decisions construing local deeds, mineral conveyances, and devises of real property
were disregarded. This conflicts with the usual practice of the Supreme Court which
was to follow the state decisions on questions of local character and espccially where
real property is involved. Schmidt, loc. cit. supra.
7. This hope was not realized because New York disapproved of Swift v. Tyson.
Stalker v. McDonald, 6 Hill 93 (N. Y. 1843). On many other questions of general law
an unusually large number of the states refused to follow the federal pronouncements.
Professor Frankfurter ascribes this to "the temptation of judges to make law according
to their own views when untrammeled by authority." Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial
Power Between United States and State Courts (1928) 13 Core. L. Q. 499, 529. Shulman,
The Demise of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 47 Yr.x L. J. 1336, 1339.
8. One attack suggested a remedy in either amending § 34 to clearly include state
common-law decisions or an abolition of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Campbell,
Is Swift v. Tyson an Argument for or Against Abolishing Diversity of Citizenship Juris-
diction? (1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 809. See Note (1938) 12 Ttrsn. L. Q. 486, 496. Another
prophetically added that Swift v. Tyson should be overruled. Dobie, Seven Implications
of Swift v. Tyson (1930) 16 VA. L. Rrv. 225, 241. Another suggested ra-ing the juris-
dictional amount to $10,000 to save the poorer litigants the expense of federal courts.
Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts
(1928) 13 Com . L. Q. 499, 526, n. 143. See also list of authorities in Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 72, n. 4, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 822, n. 4 (1938).
9. For a collection of these authorities see Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64,
77, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 822, n. 22 (1938).
10. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923)
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research had indicated that the draftsmen of that statute did not mean to limit
the freedom of the federal courts merely to statute law because that term, statute
law, was stricken from the original text and simply the word "laws" inserted.
Another anomaly of the case was that although Congress is powerless to legislate
in the field of general jurisprudence, the federal courts extended its judicial powers
to this area." A third objection to the Tyson case was that the federal courts dis-
tinguished between local and general law, a tenuous and difficult distinction for the
courts to apply.' 2 Perhaps a more important result was that far from attaining the
objective of national uniformity, there was a definite lack of uniformity of law in
each state.' 3 The height of the uncertainty of the law was reached in the Black
and White Taxicab'4 case where a corporation of one state reincorporated under the
laws of another state merely to acquire the requisite diversity of citizenship neces-
sary to evade an unfavorable state law. A final objection offered was that the Tyson
case assumed that the common law in the American states was a single system of
law. This conception was prevalent at the time because American lawyers likened
our system to the single system in England.' 5 Instead of one comprehensive system
of common law, the states individually have shaped the principles of those operative
within their respective boundaries.
Despite all the criticism evoked by the doctrine it remained the law until destroyed
by the instant case.' 0 The court held that it, the guardian of the constitution, had
37 HARv. L. RaV. 49, 82-88. Despite the acceptance of Prdfessor Warren's theory by
the majority opinion of the Tompkins case, doubt has been expressed concerning its
soundness. For nearly a century Congres did not indicate that § 34 had been misinter-
preted by the passage of corrective legislation although many bills were introduced to
amend the aforesaid section. Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 47 YAL.n L. J.
1336, 1345. See, Schweppe, What Has Happened to Federal Jurisprudence? (1938) 24
A. B. A. J. 421, 425.
§ 34 (28 U. S. C. A. § 725 [1789]) applies only to "trials at common law," yet It
was extended to include equity suits. Mason v. United States, 260 U. S. 545 (1923).
Since the Tompkins case the Supreme Court has held that in equity suits the federal
court would likewise defer to the state courts. This brings the entire Tyson doctrine
to a logical conclusion. Ruhlin v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202, 58 Sup. Ct. 860
(1938).
11. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 77, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 822 (1938). The
court declared that it had been acting unconstitutionally for nearly 100 years. They found
no clause in the Constitution which conferred the power upon the federal courts.
12. Dobie, Seven Implications of Swift v. Tyson (1930) 16 VA. L. REv. 225, 235. See
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 74, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 822, n. 8 (1938). The Sbpreme
Court points out there that the Federal Digest lists nearly a thousand decisions on the
distinction between general and local law.
13. See note 7, supra.
14. Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and
Transfer Co., 276 U. S. 518 (1928). Even individuals removed themselves from their
own state for this purpose. See Erie Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 76, 58 Sup. Ct.
817, 821, n. 19 (1938). When defeated on a point of law non-resident plaintiffs have
been known to take a nonsuit and begin all over again in the federal courts. Gardner
v. Michigan Cent. R.R. Co., 150 U. S. 349 (1893); Harrison v. Foley, 206 Fed. 57
(C. C. A. 8th, 1913); Interstate Realty and Inv. Co. of La., Inc. v. Bibb County, Ga.,
293 Fed. 721 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923).
15. McCormick & Hewins, The Collapse of "General" Law in the Federal Courts (1938)
33 I.L. L. Rav. 126, 128.
16. The court didn't find that § 34 was unconstitutional (the dissent by Butler, J. in
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overreached its powers and had been acting unconstitutionally.1 It did this, and
more. It annihilated as precedents thousands of federal cases's in which the doc-
trine of the Tyson case was applied.
Just how far this decision vwuil extend remains a riddle at present. Many questions
have been proposed but few have been answered. However, it is clear that in con-
struing the Federal Constitution, statutes, and treaties the federal courts will remain
supreme.19 The most obvious result of the decision 0 is the abolition of uncertainty
and the restoration of equal rights under the law. No longer will there be a separate
and different rule of law applied to non-citizens of a state who choose the federal
courts to air their difficulties rather than the state court of one of the parties; nor
will there be a possible situation where two persons sitting in the same scat in a
train are injured in an accident but only one can recover damages.' From nov, on
federal courts must obediently decide in accordance with state decisions. But even
this mandate is fraught with difficulties.
Will the federal judges insist on a line of state decisions before adjudicating a case
in accordance with the state law? It seems not. Only one decision will be required.
This was indicated long before Swift v. Tyson was decided while a case was pending
in the federal courts. Just before the federal appellate judge rendered his decision,
the highest state court in a similar case expounded the law and the federal judge
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 82, 5S Sup. Ct. 817, 823 (1933) indicates that
unless the constitutionality is argued below, it may not be raised on appa) but that § 34
had been originally misinterpreted. This holding of the court is weak because there
was too long a period of silent acquiescence by Congress. Shulman, The Demise of Swtft
v. Tyson (1938) 47 Y=LE L. J. 1336, 1345. Under principles of statutory construction
this is an indication that the original interpretation was correct or was at least a ratifica-
tion of that interpretation. Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U. S. 341 (1932); Conservative
Homestead Ass'n v. Conery, 169 La. 573, 125 So. 621 (1929); Succezsion of Sciaccaluga,
177 La. 795, 149 So. 458 (1933).
17. See note 11, supra.
18. See note 12, supra.
19. There are other classes of cases, peculiarly federal, in which the federal courts
remain independent. They are: admiralty: Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S.
205 (1917); interstate commerce: Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Call Publishing Co.,
181 U. S. 92 (1901); suits between states of the United States: KaMsas v. Colorado, 205
U. S. 46 (1907). These examples do not refute the statement of the instant came that
"there is no federal common law." Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 74, 53 Sup.
Ct. 817, 822 (1938). See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304
U. S. 92, 110, 58 Sup. Ct. 803, 811 (1938). This case, decided on the same day, recog-
nizes that there is a federal common law. But it is considerably delimited. No longer
is it a genera common law but merely a common law techniqrx. Such a technique would
be embodied in decisions standing as precedent for statutory and constitutional inter-
pretation. Mochzisker, The Connon Law & Our Federal Juris4rudence (1926) 74 U. or
PA. L. RIv. 270, 271. There is one author who agrees with the minority of the court
in the instant case in that there is a federal general common law. Schweppz, What Has
Happened to Federal Jurisprudence? (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 421.
20. A more immediate result has been the number of recent cases rever-cd on the
authority of the instant case. Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202, 5
Sup. Ct. 860 (1938); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 304 U. S. 261, 58 Sup. Ct.
871 (1938); Rosenthal v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 263, 53 Sup. CL 874 (1933);
Hudson v. Mooner, 304 U. S. 397, 5S Sup. Ct. 954 (1933).
21. PEPPzR, TnE BoRDzmnrAD OF Fza.EL .M, STATE Drrsio:.:s, 65.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
accepted it without question.2 Whether this same procedure would have been fol-
lowed had a lower court decided this case is hard to say.2 3 Well reasoned decisions
of lower courts have been known to command recognition. But it can confidently
be said that the law must at least be set forth authoritatively. 4 It can further be
argued that if an incorrect or outmoded state decision would be overruled at the first
opportunity in the state courts, the federal courts would be free to take the initial
step. Of course, this seems to bring back the situation existing under Swift v.
Tyson. But this power is justified because refusal to permit the federal courts this
freedom would be to perpetuate obvious error. This is in keeping with the spirit of
the Erie case. The only restriction on the federal courts is that they cannot now
decide as they think the state courts ought to decide, but as they think they would
decide. 2 5 Another liberty which the federal courts retain is the power to honestly
distinguish cases. Under the guise of exercising this power, it is possible that the
courts could revive the evils of the Tyson case but this need not create any undue
alarm. It would be attacking the integrity of the federal judiciary without basis to
believe that a judge who objected to a state precedent would use this power as a
means of escape.26
It is submitted that the instant decision will not diminish the attractiveness of
prosecuting a suit in the federal courts. There still remains the benefits of a trial
judge appointed for life and a jury selected from a wide area.2 7
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALmITY or CAPITAL STocx TAx.-Plaintiff files a claim
for a refund of a sum paid as an excess profits tax, alleging that Sections 701 and
702 of the Revenue Act of 1934,1 upon which the tax was based, were unconstitu-
tional. His ground was that the statute deprived the taxpayer of his property
without due process of law,2 by raising a conclusive presumption that the value of
a corporation's capital stock as declared in the taxpayer's return was its actual value.
On defendant's demurrer to the petition, held, that the provisions of the act in ref-
erence to the declaration of value of the capital stock did not deprive the plaintiff
of its property without due process of law; that the tax was not imposed arbitrarily
22. United States v. Morrison, 4 Pet. 123 (U. S. 1830). Disagreeing with this view
is Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 35 (1882). Now, of course, this latter case and
all others based on Swift v. Tyson have been overruled as precedents by the instant case,
and the Morrison case is re-established as the law.
23. The instant case at p. 78 specifically refers to the "highest" court of the state.
24. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts
(1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 499, 526. In Graham v. White-Phillips Co., 296 U. S. 27 (1935) the
court refused to follow an intermediate appellate court as not authoritative.
25. Note (1938) 12 TxmP. L. Q. 486. Cf. Corbin, The Common Law of the United
States (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1351, 1353. McCormick & Hewins, The Collapse of "Gencral"
Law (1938) 33 ILL. L. R.Ev. 126, 136. Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson (1938)
47 YALE L: J. 1336, 1350 (The author is probably not certain what the answers are, and
merely propounds the questions.) Even dicta construing a statute have been accepted
as indicating the direction of future state decisions and have been followed by the federal
courts. Badger v. Hoidale, 88 F. (2d) 208, 109 A. L. R. 805 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937).
26. Cf. Note (1938) 12 TE xr L. J. 486, 496.
27. McCormick Hewins, The Collapse of "General" Law (1938) 33 ILL. L. Rav.
126, 144.
1. 48 Stat. 769, 26 U. S. C. A. § 1358 (f) (1934).
2. U. S. CoNsT. Amend. V
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nor was the taxpayer denied the required opportunity to be heard before the stock
value was fixed. Demurrer sustained. Chicago Telephone Supply Co. v. Unfted
States, 23 F. Supp. 471 (Ct. Claims 1938).
The instant case is novel in that it involves the constitutionality of a statute
wherein the assessment of a tax is based upon value as declared by the taxpayer;
and as so declared binding on the United States.3 For the purpose of asessing a
capital stock tax on corporations Congress had allowed the taxpayer to declare its
value as he saw fit under 701 and 702 of the Revenue Act of 1934.4 .At the same
time the Revenue Act refused to allow the declarant to amend its original return
after it had been filed.5 Subdivision (f) of Section 701 levied another ta:, the
excess-profits tax, computed on the capital stock value as so declared.0 It seems
that the statutory device interlocking the capital stock tax and the excess-profits
tax was framed for a specific purpose: it penalized the taxpayer who unduly
depressed the value of its capital stock by increasing the amount of the excess-
profits tax. So also it rewarded the taxpayer who set down the true value of its
capital stock by lowering the related excess-profits tax. However, there was no
method provided to prevent the taxpayer from fixing the capital stock value to its
own advantage on the original declaration in the computation of the capital stock tax.
As the court in the instant case admits,7 the tax might in fact be levied on prop-
erty not according to its real value but according to a misstatement of its worth.
So one question put by the case is really whether the plaintiff's property is taken
without due process of law, since he might be paying a tax for property not in fact
worth the sum at which he valued it.
The result reached seemed in the court's opinion to conflict with some of the prin-
ciples stated in the case of Oertel Co. v. Glenn s in which the taxpayer was per-
mitted to file an amended capital stock return before the time for filing such return
3. Subdivision (f) of § 701 provided that for the first year ending June 30, 1934, "the
adjusted declared value shall be the value, as declared by the corporation in its firast return
under this section (which declaration of value cannot be amended), as of the do - of its
last income tax taxable year ending at or prior to the dose of the year for which the
tax is imposed by this section."
In the case of William B. Scaife & Sons Co. v. Driscoll, 94 F. (2d) 654 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937)
the plaintiff sought to have an act similar to the one in the instant case declared uncon-
stitutional. The Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court in the ruling that the
question of constitutionality called for a declaratory judgment, but that subjects of fed-
eral taxation were specifically excluded from the operation of the Declaratory Judgment
Act. 49 Stat. 1027 § 405 (1935) 28 U. S. C. A. § 400 (Supp. 1937).
4. This appears to be the first provision in any Revenue Act which allows the tax-
payer rather than the government to fix conclusively the value of the subject to be taxed.
5. It has been the general policy not to allow amended tax returns to be filed after
the taxpayer has made a valuation with full knowledge of the facts. See Pacific National
Co. v. Welch, 304 U. S. 191 (193S) (income tax); Commisioner v. Moore, 48 F. (2d)
526, 523 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931) (excess profits tax); Marks v. United States, 18 F. Supp.
911, 918 (S. D. New York 1937) (income tax); United States v. Kaplan, 304 U. S. 195
(1938) (income tax). See also Paul and Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, (1934)
§ 53.05.
6. The act computed the excess-profits tax at 5 per cent of such portion of the net
income of the corporation as was in excess of 12, per cent of the adjusted declared
value of its capital stock.
7. See instant case at page 474.




had expired. It was said by the court in that case that if the declaration of value
of the capital stock cannot be amended to show the real value, the statute raises a
conclusive presumption that the tax is to be levied on the declared value, regardless
of the actual value, and thus it is violative of the Fifth Amendment.
The due process clause of the Constitution does limit the taxing power of Congress
in those instances where a tax is so arbitrary or capricious as to transgress the
constitutional bounds.9 Nevertheless, due process of law is saved in the assessment
of the tax in question in one respect at least. The taxpayer was given an oppor-
tunity to be heard, in effect similar to the opportunity granted in the ordinary
assessment. 'In the usual assessment proceedings, the value of the subject to be
taxed is fixed by the government after submission of schedules by the taxpayer, and
the taxpayer is allowed to appeal any assessment which he feels to be unreasonable. 10
The party taxed must then declare a value and the courts will say whether the de-
clarant shall receive or be refused the value so set. In the instant case the tax-
payer is heard favorably without court action.
Nor does it seem that because the property value may be set at the caprice of
the taxpayer, the tax in the instant case is unconstitutional. It is submitted that
the method will not be oppressive nor lack uniform application. A taxpayer is not
oppressed by a law which gives complete freedom to make an honest return. Nor
does the method deprive any taxpayer of the equal protection of the law. Ordinary
arithmetic will usually indicate to the careful taxpayer that valuation of stock
which will permit him or it to pay the least total tax. All corporations have this
opportunity and pay according to the same-rate.
Admitting the constitutionality of the tax, it must be pointed out that there were
equitable grdunds for the instant decision which distinguish the principal case from
the Oertel case. In that case the amended return was filed before the tax liability
had accrued. 1 In the instant case the taxpayer filed a claim for a refund of its
paid excess-profits taxes a year after they were due. Permitting an amended return
under these circumstances would place a burden upon the government since the tax
liabilities would have to be readjusted and recomputed.12 Likewise plans and
expenditures were probably made by the government on the basis of the collections
to come due. Its books were closed and could be reopened only at much expense.
Logically then, the instant decision seems to be placed on strong grounds and
9. Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497, 504 (1930); Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R.
Co., 240 U. S. 1, 24 (1915).
10. Turner v. Wade, 254 U. S. 64, 68 (1920); Londerer v. City and County of Denver,
210 U. S. 373, 385 (1908). For a discussion of the requirements of notice under taxation
statutes, see Cooley, Taxation (Nichols ed. 1924) § 1113.
11. See Glenn v. Certel, 13 F. Supp. 654 (Kentucky 1936) aff'd, 97 F. (2d) 495, 496
(C. C. A. 6th, 1938). The courts seem willing to allow the taxpayer to file an amended
tax return as long as it is within the permissible limit and no question of estoppel arises.
See the case of Lucas v. Sterling Oil & Gas Co., 62 F. (2d) 951 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933) where
the taxpayer was allowed to file an amended income tax return within the permissible
limit, the original return having been filed without complete knowledge of the material facts.
In William B. Scaife & Sons Co. v. Driscoll, 94 F. (2d) 664 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937), the
plaintiff sought as alternative relief, an order enjoining the collector of Internal Revenue
from refusing to accept an amended capital stock return. The court held that the plain-
tiff's suit was to restrain the assessment and collection of excess-profits taxes and such a
suit cannot be maintained in view of the provisions of § 3224 of the Revised Statutes, 26
U. S. C. A. § 1543. However, the court said that the plaintiff had an action at law for
the recovery of any taxes based upon the value given in its first return.
12. Pacific National Co. v. Welch, 304 U. S. 191 (1938).
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the Oertel case is weak insofar as its dicta disagree. It is submitted that the method
of assessment used by the statute is not perfect 13 but as a practical matter the only
one feasible. True, this statute and decision will allow the government to levy a tax
even where the taxpayer has made an innocent mistake' 4 and the tax will not be
based on actual values. It makes the collection of taxes something of a battle of
wits between government experts and private tax consultants, on the part of the
latter to juggle values to the profit of the taxpayer and on the part of the former to
devise defenses against the overly shrewd. But nevertheless, if the government
were to be forced to employ assessors, sending them into each corporation in the
country to investigate and determine the actual value of its capital stock, the costs
of such visitations would probably defeat the purpose of the tax as a revenue
producer.
CONTRACTS-INFA cy-RIGHT oF DisnrrramCE.-The plaintiff almost one year
after attaining his majority sued the defendant corporation to recover money paid
as tuition for instruction in aviation. The instruction was contracted for and received
by the plaintiff while he was between the ages of twenty and twenty-one years. On
appeal from an order for judgment for the defendant, held, that the plaintiff might
disaffirm the contracts and recover in full the consideration that he had paid. Order
reversed. Adamowski v. Curtiss-Wright Flying Scrvice, Inc., 15 N. E. (2d) 467
(Mass. 1938).
With a few exceptions and limitations imposed by statute and otherwise,' the con-
tracts of infants are now treated as voidable.2  But from ancient times minors have
been held liable for the reasonable value of the necessaries purchased by them.3
Such is the law in New York today.4 The basis of this obligation, it may be noted,
13. The validity of the act may be questioned on other grounds which were not
included in the plaintiff's argument but which the court mentioned in an obiter dictum
(p. 473). The act permitted the taxpayer to declare the value of its capital ztock before
July 31, 1934. The declared value applied not only to the year 1934 but to all Eubsequent
years and no changes could be made. The court says that this may be challenged on con-
stitutional grounds. The fluctuations in the value of a share of stoc: from year to year
preclude any attempt to fix a reasonable settled value for it over a period of years.
14. But there was no sign of innocent mistake in the present case. The declared value
of the capital stock was $444,847.99 and the actual value was in excess of SZ,0DC00O.
1. In re W. 3. Floyd & Co., 156 Fed. 206 (E. D. N. C. 1907); Gay v. Johnson, 32 X. H.
167 (1855); Rahman v. Bethel, 236 App. Div. 182, 258 N. Y. Supp. 2S6 (3d Dep't 1932)
(statute); N. Y. Lrs. Lw (1930) § 55; N. Y. PERs. Pnop. Lw (1913) §§ 163, 169; 3
PAGE, Co-ra.cTs (rev. ed. 1920) §1574.
2. Sternlieb v. Normandie National Securities Corp., 263 N. Y. 245, 13 N. E. 726
(1934); Casey v. Kastel, 237 N. Y. 305, 143 N. E. 671 (1924); In re Willmott's Estate,
211 Iowa 34, 230 N. W. 330 (1930); McDonald v. Sargent, 171 Mass. 492, 51 N. E.
17 (1S98).
3. As early as the fifteenth century it was well settled that an infant was liable for
necessaries. To be sure, this does not mean that the infant is liable where neceszaries
are already being supplied by a guardian or parent ready, willing and able to supply them.
The articles must be actually necessary before he can be held. 1 Wiresro!., Co:mumc's
(rev. ed. 1938) §§ 223, 240.




is not contractual but quasi-contractual, 5 though the minor may if he choose stand
upon his contract and enjoy the advantage of a good bargain.
In the light of precedent in New York( and elsewhere, it cannot be said that the
court ran counter to established principle in its rejection of the defendant's first
contention, that the contract was for necessaries. Instruction in aviation may
reasonably be deemed unessential7 to the welfare of the young man of twenty, even
in the highly mechanized civilization of the present era. American judges,8 like
their English brethren,9 have not been willing to give the word "necessary" a broad
interpretation. While both have declared a proper education necessary' 0 and have
suggested that under certain circumstances the word might be applied to a classical
or professional training,11 the judiciary has been reluctant to apply it beyond the
limits of the trade12 and grammar' 3 schools. It would appear that the courts in
reaching their conclusions look particularly to the nexus between the instruction
given the infant and its practical value to him in the earning and preservation of his
livelihood. An extended education, they feel, is more apt to be a gem adorning the
personality than a tool in the hand of the breadwinner.14 In the present case it
might conceivably have been found that the courses given the minor by the defendant
fell into the category of "trades" and were perhaps necessary as such.15 But the
court was not required to make such a finding as a matter of law. What consti-
5. The infant need not even have promised to pay for the necessaries furnished. See
Trainer v. Trumbull, 141 Mass. 527, 530, 6 N. E. 761, 162 (1886); 1 WLISTOn, CoN-
TRACTs (rev. ed. 1938) § 240.
6. Since the contracts were made in New York, the Massachusetts court determined
the issues involved by the New York law. See principal case at p. 467; 2 BE, CONFLICT
OF LAws (1935) § 332.4.
7. But see Curtiss v. Roosevelt Aviation School, 5 Am LAW RE.V EW 382 (Mun. Ct.
1934), where a contract for aviation instruction to prepare an infant to be a mechanic
was considered a contract for necessaries. The fact that some of our public schools now
offer courses in aeronautics is also worthy of attention in this regard.
8. International Text Book Co. v. Doran, 80 Conn. 307, 68 Atl. 255 (1907) wherein
a course in electricity was held unnecessary for a minor; Ryan v. Smith, 165 Mass. 303,
43 N. E. 109 (1895), wherein chairs and other articles of furniture for infant's barber
shop were held not to be necessaries; Schoenung v. Gallet, 206 Wis. 52, 238 N. W. 852
(1931), where it was held that an automobile used to carry the infant to and from work
was not necessary, there being other means of transportation.
9. But in England the law is more lenient than in the United States. Roberts v.
Gray [1913] 1 K. B. 520: instructions in billiards is a necessary; see Barnes v. Toye
(1884) 13 Q. B. 410, 414. I ,VMLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1938) § 241.
10. See International Text Book v. Connelly, 206 N. Y. 188, 195, 99 N. E. 722, 725
(1912) ; Walter v. Everard (1891) 2 Q. B. 369, 376.
11. International Text Book Co. v. Connelly, 206 N. Y. 188, 99 N. E. 722 (1912); see
Halsted v. Halsted, 228 App. Div. 298, 299, 239 N. Y. Supp. 422, 424 (1930).
12. Pardy v. American Ship-Windlass Co., 20 R. I. 147, 37 AtL. 706 (1897); Walter v.
Everard (1891) 2 Q. B. 369.
13. Stone v. Dennison, 30 Mass. 1 (1832); Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16 Vt.
683, 42 Am. Dec. 537 (1844).
14. Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16 Vt. 683, 42 Am. Dec. 537 (1844). But see 3
PAGE, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1920) § 1588 for a criticism of this attitude.
15. It is well to note that although instruction may be calculated to prepare an infant
for a trade, it does not follow inevitably that it is a necessary so far as he individually




tutes a necessary is a mixed question of law and fact, the judge deciding whether
as a matter of law the articles may be considered necessaries, the jury determining
whether they were so in fact under the peculiar circumstances of the infant's way
of life, his station and his prospects.' 6
As for the defendant's second contention, that the infant's disaffm=nce was too
late, coming a year after attainment of majority, the circumstances of the indi-
vidual case must determine whether indeed the minor has acquiesced too long after
coming to adulthood to disaffirm an executed contract.1 7 The courts in general
insist upon a clear, unequivocal ratification.' s  But in one case a delay of thirteen
months after attainment of majority has been declared ureasonable.' 0  In another
case a delay of three years has been held not to constitute ratification.20  In the
instant case the court observed that by the quondam infant's failure to disaffirm
the executed contracts sooner he gained nothing and the defendant lost nothing.
Hence the court was not obliged to look to the insinuation of equitable considera-
tions.2 '
It is the defendant's last contention that is especially interesting, providing as
it does a fairly novel twist to a familiar situation. For whether he would have it
so or not, the infant cannot restore the intangible consideration received from the
other party. On this ground the defendant sought judgment.
Where tangible property has been the consideration received, New York judicial
policy has compelled the infant disaffirming to return it2 or as much of it as he
is able.23 Yet in the event that he has lost, squandered or otherwise disposed of it,
the right of renunciation is not denied him.-4 In the leading case of Rice v. Butleri' 5
an infant who purchased a bicycle on the instalment plan sought to disaffirm the
contract of purchase and recover the instalments she had paid. She was com-
pelled to account for the deterioration in value of the property from the use of
which she had received benefit. For, said the court, the plea of infancy must be
used as a shield, not as a sword.20 When later confronted with the case of Stcrnlieb
16. McKanna v. Merry, 61 Ill. 177 (1871).
17. Levenberg v. Ludington, 152 Misc. 735, 274 N. Y. Supp. 193 (Co. Ct. 1934); Horo-
witz v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 239 App. Div. 693, 263 N Y. Supp. 729 (1st Dep't 1934).
Note that contracts relating to personal property may be avoided even during minority,
whereas those relating to realty may be disaffirmed only after attainment of majority.
O'Donohue v. Smith, 130 App. Div. 214, 114 N. Y. Supp. 536 (1st Dep't 1909).
18. International Text Book Co. v. Connelly, 206 N. Y. 183, 99 N. E. 722 (1912); Par-
sons v. Teller, 188 N. Y. 318, 80 N. E. 930 (1907).
19. Campbell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 307 Pa. 365, 161 Atl. 310 (1932).
20. Green v. Green, 69 N. Y. 553 (1877). If the contract be in the executory stag(
it need not be disaffirmed at all until suit is actually brought to enforce it. The burden,
moreover, is on the other party to prove the infant's ratification. Washington Street
Garage, Inc. v. Maloy, 230 App. Div. 266, 243 N. Y. Supp. 467 (4th Dep't 1930).
21. Where an infant's delay unduly embarrasses the adult party to the infant's advan-
tage, the courts are quick to curtail the prerogative of disaffirmance. Levenberg v. Luding-
ton, 152 Misc. 735, 274 N. Y. Supp. 193 (Co. Ct. 1934).
22. Sperandera v. Staten Is. Garage, 117 Misc. 780, 193 N. Y. Supp. 392 (Mun. Ct. 1921).
23. Casey v. Kastel, 237 N. Y. 305, 142 N. E. 671 (1924); McCarthy v. Bowling Green
Storage & Van Co., 182 App. Div. 18, 169 N. Y. Supp. 463 (1st Dep't 1918)
24. Petrie v. Williams, 68 Hun. 589, 23 N. Y. Supp. 237 (Sup. Ct. 1893).
25. Rice v. Butler, 160 N. Y. 57S, 5 N. E. 275 (1899). Cf. Myers v. Hurley Motor
Co. Inc., 273 U. S 18 (1927).
26. For the same thought cf. Lown v. Spoon, 158 App. Div. 900, 143 N. Y. Supp. 275
(2d Dep't 1913).
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v. Normandie National Securities Corp.,27 the Court of Appeals refused to extend
the rule laid down in Rice v. Butler. In that case a minor who had falsely repre-
sented himself to be an adult in purchasing shares of stock was permitted to dis-
affirm the contract of purchase upon the unsuccessful eventuation of his experiment
with the market. Upon returning the worthless stock he recovered the money paid.
He received through the contract no substantial benefit for which the court might
compel him to account, whereas in the bicycle case the minor did enjoy material
benefits.
The instant case is of course distinguishable from both of these in one important
respect. While the minor cannot restore the consideration received, he has never-
theless kept all the advantages accruing from his bargain. The query is, may he
equitably be charged for such benefits retained by him?2 8 The Massachusetts Court
confessed to some confusion because of the seeming logical vacillation of the New
York cases 29 and with diffidence gave its judgment to the plaintiff. The infant
appears thereby to have accomplished the difficult task of "eating his cake and
having it too." It seems clear that he has been unjustly enriched, from the
academic if not also the utilitarian standpoint, at the expense of the innocent
defendant.
It is rather to be wished, in pursuit of equity, that the Massachusetts court had
adopted the spirit of the case of Rice v. Butler. As it was, the Court seemed much
impressed by the fact that the contract was not for necessaries and concluded there.
fore that the infant ought to be permitted to disaffirm. But the New York Court
of Appeals in Rice v. Butler did not consider such a fact sufficient grounds for ,per-
mitting the minor to escape liability for benefits received. The test of liability would
seem not always to be whether the consideration received was in truth necessary for
the infant, but whether the infant received material benefit therefrom at the
expense of the innocent adult. Can it be said with logical or ethical consistency
that an infant must pay for the pleasure of bicycling and the resultant deterioration
27. Sternlieb v. Normandie National Securities Corp., 263 N. Y. 245, 188 N. E.
726 (1934).
28. For holdings in jurisdictions outside New York, see Johnson v. Northwestern
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 56 Minn. 365, 59 N. W. 992 (1894), where an infant avoided
an insurance policy on his own life and recovered the premiums. He was required to
pay the reasonable value of insurance protection enjoyed. (This is definitely a minority
view, however.) Note, too, the interesting case of Neilson v. International Text Book Co.,
106 Me. 104, 75 AtI. 330 (1909) wherein a minor who entered into a contract for courses
in electrical engineering and paid $88 in advance was permitted to disaffirm and recover
the money paid, after returning the books supplied by the defendant. The court con-
sidered no bar to such action the fact that the infant retained intangible intellectual benefit
from the use of the property purchased.
Compare the case of Wallin v. Highland Park Co., 127 Iowa 131, 102 N. W. 839 (1905).
In that case an infant repudiated a contract for a course in pharmacy and was permitted
to recover only the amount paid in by him less reasonable compensation for the instruc-
tion received. Observe, however, that the course in pharmacy was considered a necessary,
a fact which obviously distinguishes the case from the principal one.
29. The New York courts insist that the minor account for the depreciation resulting
from the use to which he has put the articles received by him, in virtue of the disaffirmed
contract. But if the consideration received was money and he has spent it, such fact
will not prejudice his right of disaffirmance. Or if he disposed of whatever goods he received
after using them for a time, it would seem that he might recover all his payments without
deduction. This particular problem, however, has not been definitely settled.
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of the machine, but not for the intellectual and possibly practical benefits of a course
in aviation, given by the adult at no little cost in time, money and effort?
All in all, the fact of the matter seems to be that the New York law of infant's
contracts is in need of reform with relation to the maturer youth who has passed
the age of eighteen or nineteen.30 The law is solicitous of the minor for his improvi-
dence and his folly. He is not protected from either by the complete legal con-
donation of his own bad faith and inequitable conduct. Reform has of late years
been attempted in the legislature, thus far without success.31
CannsmNAL LAW-RiGHT OF THE AccUSED TO INSPECT THE PROSECUTION'S EVI-
DENCE BE ORE TprA.-The defendant was indicted for murder in the first degree.
Before trial, he moved for an order directing the district attorney to permit a
fingerprint expert, retained by the defendant, to examine a pistol bearing finger-
prints alleged to be the defendant's and to furnish a photostatic copy of his
fingerprints taken at the time of his arrest. Defendant learned of the pistol by
newspaper articles to the effect that such evidence existed. Held, application will
be denied where the defendant merely surmises that the district attorney is in
possession of such evidence. People v. Gatti, 167 Misc. 545, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 130
(Sup. Ct. 1938).
In the instant case the court denied the defendant's application on the ground
that his moving papers failed to establish that the evidence of which an inspection
was desired was really in the district attorney's hands. Yet the court wrote an
extended opinion indicating its hope that the State Legislature would remove the
present uncertainty surrounding the problem of the inspection of evidence in criminal
cases before trial. It is unfortunate that this problem' has been the source of
30. Some reform has been accomplished statutorily and judicially in several other juris-
dictions. New Hampshire and Minnesota have adopted in their deciions the so-called
"Provident Rule", by which an infant is liable on contracts to the extent that they have
benefited him. Hall v. Butterfield, 59 N. H. 354, 359 (1379); Berglund v. American
Multigraph Sales Co., 135 Minn. 67, 160 N. W. 191 (1916). But note that even under
the Provident Rule, the infant in the principal case would probably have recovered. For
the court thought that the courses were of no apparent benefit to him. For similar
reforms, effected by statute, see among others CAr. Crv. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 33-37;
IDAHo CODE ANN. (1932) § 31-103, 31-105; IOWA CoDE (1935) § 10493, 10494; K,.. Grn.
STAT. AiNN. (1935) c. 38 § 102-3; T=xi€. Con (Wirll. Shan. & Harsh 1932) § 10370; VA.
CODE Aza. (1930) § 6103; WAsH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 5329, 5330.
31. The most recent proposal in the New York legislature was to lower the age of con-
tractual capacity to eighteen years in cases:
"(a) where the contract was made for purposes of the infant's education and was
reasonable and provident when made, (b) where the contract was made in connection with
-a business in which the infant was engaged and was reasonable and provident when
made and (c) where, from a misrepresentation as to his majority made in the hand-
writing of the infant, the other party to the contract had, at the time the contract was
made, reasonable cause to believe, and did believe, that the infant was of full age."
LrsTsxr-=v Docua r (1938) § 65(I).
1. The question, herein, does not concern the accused's right to inspection of the minutes
of the grand jury, his right to be furnished with the names of the state's witnezes, nor
his right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. N. Y. CODE Crmn. Pnoc. §V 3,
952t; People ex rel. Hirschberg v. Supreme Court of New York, 269 N. Y. 392, 199 N. E. 634
1933]
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such great judicial conflict and that authoritative decisions are lacking in this state.
At common law, the courts denied that they had any power, even in civil
cases, to order an inspection of evidence in advance of a trial 2 Equity sought to
remedy this defect by framing a separate and awkward kind of suit known as
discovery and inspection,8 by which the production of evidence in the possession
of an adverse party and material to the right, title or defence of the party seeking
the relief could be compelled. The New York Civil Practice Act has borrowed this
equitable remedy so that a party to a civil suit may be allowed to inspect, copy
or photograph a book, document, other paper or chattel which is held or controlled
by the adverse party.4 Yet, even in these cases, the jurisdiction is limited, so that
an order of inspection will not be granted for purely exploratory purposes, nor
where the subject sought to be inspected will be inadmissible at the trial.0
However, there is no statute in this state available to a party in a criminal cause
under which he may be granted the remedy of discovery and inspection before trial
as may be done in a civil case under the present Civil Practice Act.7 Consequently,
(1936); People v. Beyer, 163 Misc. 890, 297 N. Y. Supp. 913 (County Ct. 1937). But
rather, we are concerned with his right to obtain, before trial, an examination of evidence
of a material nature which is held by the prosecution.
2. Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U. S. 533 (1911); Denslow v. Fowler, 2 Cow. 592 (N. Y.
1824); McQuigan v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 129 N. Y. 50, 29 N. E. 235 (1891). In
3 WIGMORE, EvIEx.NcE (2d ed. 1923) § 1862 it is said, "So far as concerned chattels and
premises in his possession or control, the adversary in common law actions, like the true
gamester that the law encouraged him to be, held safely the trump cards of the situation,
free from any legal liability of disclosure before trial."
3. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 167 Ala. 557, 52 So. 751
(1910) ; Shotwell v. Struble, 21 N. J. Eq. 31 (1870) ; State v. Security Savings & Trust Co.,
28 Ore. 410, 43 Pac. 162 (1910); 2 STORY, EQury JUiUsPRUDENcE (13th ed. 1886) § 1485.
4. The codification of the equitable remedy began with the N. Y. Revised Statutes of
1829, 2 REV. STAT. 199, c. 1, § 21 which gave to the Supreme Court the power to compel
a party to a civil suit, "to produce and discover books, papers and documents in his
possession or power relating to the merits of any such suit, or of any defense therein."
This remedy was extended to other courts of record by the CODE OF CIvM PROCr.DUR § 803
and the scope of the remedy was enlarged allowing, in addition, discovery of "any article
or property" in an adversary's possession. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACr (1920) § 324 has in turn
adopted this rule.
5. Woods v. De Figaniere, 25 How. Pr. 522 (N. Y. 1863); Falco v. New York, N. H.
& H. R.R., 161 App. Div. 735, 146 N. Y. Supp. 1024 (2d Dep't 1914) ; Chandler v. State,
60 Tex. Cr. R. 329, 131 S. W. 598 (1910). Cf. National Bank of Ridgewood v. American
Surety Co, 239 App. Div. 853, 264 N. Y. Supp. 421 (2d Dep't 1933) (wherein the court
held that the examination may be terminated at any time if it appears that the defendant
is pursuing a policy of delay).
6. Knight v. Waterford, 2 Younge & Coll. Ex. 22, 36, 160 Eng. Reprints 296, 302
(1836). In the leading New York case, People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court of New
York, 245 N. Y. 24, 29, 156 N. E. 84, 85 (1927), Cardozo, Ch. J., said "Documents to be
subject to inspection must be evidence themselves"; 4 CARMODY, NEw YoRX PRAecnc
(2d ed. 1932) § 1276.
7. There is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which will authorize an
inspection of evidence before trial. Nor does § 392, of the code, which is to the effect
that the rules of evidence shall be the same in criminal as in civil causes, aid us since
the provisions of the Cv'l PRAcarcE AcT § 324 which deal with the remedy of discovery
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our courts must turn to the common law, where as a general rule, the accused
is denied the right of inspection.8 But this general rule denying the accused the
right of inspection is not universally followed and contrary decisions have been
numerous, with the result that we have, at present, clashing and contradictory
rules and precedents, even in New York where lower courts of equal rank disagree.0
The question first arose in Rex. v. Holland,"° decided in England, which held
that where an information was filed against the defendant, an officer of the Fast
India Co., on charges of delinquency, based on a report of a board of inquiry in
India, the defendant had no right to inspect that report. This ruling has been
explained on the ground that the court could find neither principle nor precedent
to warrant the granting of an inspection. 11 But it is important to note that the
report sought to be inspected in the Holland case would have been inadmissible as
evidence at the trial' 2 and perhaps the decision can be distinguished on that ground.
Whether the holding of the English Court was justified or not, the fact remains
that its decision has been approved not only in the instant case but by the majority
of the courts in this country.' 3 Many other courts, however, committed themselves
to a more conciliatory attitude and it appears to be the trend of the modem deci-
sions to grant an inspection where the subject sought to be inspected is itself
evidence and a failure of justice may result from its suppression. 14
The cases that allow an inspection find justification for their decision on the
ground that the primary purpose of a trial, civil or criminal, is to ascertain the
truth and that by giving the defendant an opportunity to know what will be charged
and inspection are not strictly rules of evidence. For the distinctions between a *ule ol
evidence and a rule of procedure or pleading, see 3 WimwmOR, Es,-r'c (2d cd. 1923)
§ 184S.
8. State v. Jeffries, 117 Kan. 742, 232 Pac. 873 (1925); Wendling v. Commonwealtt
143 Ky. 587, 137 S. W. 205 (1911); Commonwealth v. Jord", 207 Alms. 259, 93 N. .
809 (1911); 2 WMARTox, Ci ar=- EvmEC (11th ed. 1935) § 770. In 9 HA Usny,
LAws or ENGLAND (2d ed. 1933) § 280, it is said "In criminal casze neitbLr party can
obtain evidence from the opposite side by means of interrogations or discovery of docu-
ments."
It goes without saying, of course, that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
prevents any such concession to the prosecution. U. S. Co,sr. Amend. V; N. Y. SrArZ
CoNsT. Art. 1, § 6.
9. An inspection has been allowed in the following cases: People v. Gcrold, 265 Ill. 448,
107 N. E. 165 (1914); State v. Howland, 100 Kan. 181, 163 Pac. 1071 (1917); Sprinkle
v. State, 137 Miss. 731, 102 So. 844 (1925); State v. Tippett, 317 Mlo. 319, 296 S. W.
132 (1927). The New York cases which disagree with the holding of the instant cases are:
People v. Terzani, 149 lisc. 818, 269 N. Y. Supp. 620 (County Ct. 1933) wherein the
court granted an inspection of the gun held by the district attorney saying that the
defendant should be entitled to the benefit of any 'reasonable opportunity to prepare his
defence. People v. Wargo, 149 Mlisc. 461, 268 N. Y. Supp. 40 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
10. 4 T. R. 691, 100 Eng. Reprints 1248 (K. B. 1792).
11. Ibid.; State ex rel. Robertson v. Steele, 117 Blinn. 384, 135 N. W. 1129 (1912).
12. The report of the board of inquiry was mere hearsay and as such would have
been inadmissable upon the trial of the defendant since it is an elementaly rule of
evidence that the declarations of third parties, who are not examined as witnesss, made
out of court, are inadmissable. Ricmamsozz, EVIDYNcE (5th ed. 1936) § 239.
13. See note 8, supra.
14. People v. Radeloff, 140 M isc. 690, 252 N. Y. Supp. 290 (Sup. Ct. 1931); caes
cited in note 9 supra.
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against him, he may investigate and prepare for trial.' 5 It is because of their
desire to effect justice that these courts allow an inspection of the prosecution's
evidence, sometimes despite the absence of either statute or precedent authorizing
them to do so.16 It would seem that the result reached by these courts is the
more favorable one, inasmuch as the state should not seek to procure a conviction
by unfair concealment nor should it be less concerned with having the innocent
acquitted than with convicting the guilty. The argument advanced by those favor-
ing the majority rule, to the effect that there may be an unscrupulous tampering
with the evidence, and that the inspection might lead to a manufacturing of a
denial or alibi, does not carry enough weight to counterbalance the advantages
of allowing an inspection.17 If the evidence which is sought to be examined is
true and is as damaging as the prosecution contends, then the state can suffer no
harm by the examination, for where justice and fairness are concerned the truth
can produce no harm.'8 If such an examination is properly supervised, as is done
in civil cases, there will be no tampering nor injury to the evidence. On the other
hand, if the evidence in the prosecution's hands is false or manufactured, the
accused should be given an opportunity to expose its falsity and prepare his defense.
Without the inspection he might have been convicted by false accusations and
fabricated evidence.
This leads us to condemn the common law rule.19 It is suggested that because
of this, the legislature take a hand in the matter and, by statute, provide for a
remedy similar to that granted in civil cases.
EVIDENCE-IMPEACHMENT OF PARTY'S OWN WITNzss.-Defendant was charged
with the murder of an internal revenue investigator. The government introduced a
witness who, prior to th trial, had, in a sworn statement, said, that he was present,
when the defendant ordered a lookout to shoot any person approaching his illegal
still. The District Attorney, several days before the trial, had obtained written
evidence that the witness, while in jail had been persuaded by his sister to change
his testimony when he came before the judge. However, the witness was placed on
the stand and after obtaining his testimony, the government proceeded to introduce
15. State v. Hinkley, 81 Kan. 838, 106 Pac. 1088 (1910); State v. Jeffries, 117 Kan.
742, 232 Pac. 873 (1925) (dissent by Johnston, Ch. J.); State v. Tippett, 317 Mo. 319,
296 S. W. 132 (1927) (the court, in allowing a pre-trial inspection of a state witness'
written statement, said "That it was desired that the state's evidence remain undisclosed,
partakes of the nature of a game, rather than judicial procedure.")
16. United States v. Rich, 6 Alaska 670 (1922) (the accused sought to inspect and
photograph a piece of glass in the custody of the prosecutor upon which it was claimed
were fingerprints of the defendant. In granting the right to inspect, the court said
"I am unable to see any ground for refusing the application except that there is no ex-
press statutory provision for granting it, and no precedent has been cited. . . . The
defendant is entitled to have every opportunity to prepare his defense."). See State v.
Bramhall, 134 La. 1, 63 So. 603 (1913).
17. See Daly v. Dimock, 55 Conn. 579, 589, 12 At. 405, 406 (1888); 3 WiGMORE,
EviENzcE (2d ed. 1923) § 1859g.
18. People v. Rogas, 158 Misc. 567, 287 N. Y. Supp. 100 (County Ct. 1936) (the
accused's motion to permit his alienists to examine all statements made by him to members
of the police department or members of the district attohney's staff was granted),
19. See 3 WIGMORE, Ev'DENcE (2d ed. 1923) § 1863 wherein the learned commentator
says "Modern rationalism should extend to the accused this right of inspection."
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into evidence his prior inconsistent statements. On appeal from a judgment of con-
viction, held, one judge dissenting, the party offering the witness must be really
surprised at his testimony before he may impeach him. A witness vhose testimony
the offeror knows will be adverse may not be called in order to get before the jury
in the form of impeachment, contradictory statements of his, which are useful to
the offeror. Judgment reversed. Yowug v. The United States, 97 F. (2d) 200 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1938).
The extent of the right to impeach one's own witness has always been trouble-
some.' To this day the courts of various jurisdictions are unsettled. The strict
common law rule would not permit a party under any circumstances to impeach his
own witness. 2 However, inroads upon this rule have been made through the medium
of alleged exceptions to the rule3 and by legislation."I
Yet even today the various states by decision and by legislation seem almost
unanimous in prohibiting the impeachment of a party's own vitness by proof of
poor character, supposedly upon the theory that the party producing the witness
vouches for him.3 However, they are far from unanimous in their attitude toward
1. As early as 1681 the courts of England were being vexed by the problem. Fitzharris
Trial, S How. St. Tr. 233, 369, 373. It made its debut in this country in the early North
Carolina case of State v. Norris, 1 Hay 429, 1 Am. Dec. 564 (N. C. 1796); and in New
York with the case of Lawrence v. Barker, 5 Wend. 301 (N. Y. 1830).
2. Coolidge's Trial, 8 How. St. Tr. 549, 636 (1631); Warren Hastings' Trial, 31 Parl
Hist. 369 (1788); Ewer v. Ambrose, 2 B. & C. 746 (1825); Barham v. State, 130 Tex. Cr. Rep.
223, 93 S. W. (2d) 741 (1936); (1936) 15 Tm'. L. Rrv. 132-3.
Supposedly the doctrine was the outcome of the ancient system of "oath helpers ' or
"compurgators". 2 Wioaoax, EvmsicE (2d ed. 1923) 896. However, this theory has
been discredited to some extent by writers. See Al. Ladd, Impeadhment of One's Own
lVitness-New Developrients (1936) 4 U. CHr. L. REv. 69; Pollock & 1aitland, 10 Hsrony
or ENci=S LAw (1923) § 4; HoLims, THE Coaxon Low: (1231) 255 c seq.
3. Among the exceptions listed are, surprise, hostility of the witness, etc. See discussion
in Putnam v. U. S. 162 U. S. 687, 697 (1896); see note 6, infra.
4. 15 & 16 Vict. C. 27 III (1852); 17 & 18 Vict. C. 125 § 22 (1854); Tr=. A.:;. Coos
Cran. PRoc. (Vernon, 1926) art. 732; Naw Yom L ws 1936, c. 191, amend. N. Y. LAws
1937 c. 307 (affecting N. Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr § 343a and N. Y. CoDE oP CnP-. PEoC.
§ Sa. The New York statute provides that:
"In addition to impeachment in the manner now permitted by law, any party may intro-
duce proof that a witness has made a prior statement, inconsistent with his testimony,
irrespective of the fact that the party has called the witness or made the witness his own,
provided that such prior inconsistent statement was made in any writing by him sub-
scribed or was made under oath."
5. People v. Minsky, 227 N. Y. 94, 124 N. E. 126 (1919); see Coolidge's Trial, 8 How St.
Tr. 549, 636 (16S1); Hastings' Trial, 31 Parl Hist. 369. However, this has been severely
criticized. M. Ladd, Impeachment of One's Witness-Ne-w Developments (1936) 4 U. or
Cm. L. REv. 69, 2 Wicmoa, Evman,zcr 896. In 1934 The Commission on the Administration
of Justice in the State of New York, in their report for that year (at p. 299) argued that
since it often happens that counsel is "surprised" by the hostility of a witness, and since
it is often necessary to produce witnesses that are hostile, the New York Civil Practice Act
should be amended to provide that if the court should believe that such is the case, then
the party should be permitted to give such proof of poor character of the witness (a) before
the witness gives his testimony or (b) afterward, provided counsel first learned of the
witneS' hostility after he had testified. The New York State Bar A.sociation adopted
this proposal (1935) 58 REP. N. Y. S. B. A. 235. In spite of this the New York Legis-
lature completely omitted this provision when they adopted the new sections. N. Y.
Qv. PRAc. ACr (1936) § 343a; N. Y. CODE CRMn. PRo. (1936) § Sa.
1938]
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counsel attempting to get alleged prior inconsistent statements into evidence for the
purpose of neutralizing the evidence given at the trial and impeaching the credibility
of their own witness.0 For years many courts in the United States have adhered
to the old common law rule holding proof of such statements inadmissible. 7 Other
courts have admitted them.8 After the decision of Melhuislh v. Collier,0 the English
Parliament passed a statute, providing in effect that when, in the opinion of the court,
a party's own witness should prove adverse, the court may in its discretion permit
proof of such prior inconsistent statements.10
Perhaps the most substantial reason for the rule against any impeachment of a
party's own witness by the introduction of prior inconsistent statements, is the fear
that the jury will consider the prior statement as proof of the material facts in
issue and will not use it merely to impeach the credibility of the witness or nullify
him as a witness.11  The chief criticism of this reasoning seems to be that since a
6. These courts are not inconsistent in ruling that the ". . . trial court can in its
discretion, permit upon direct examination a leading question to be asked when counsel
conducting the examination is surprised by the statement of his witness." St. Clare v.
United States, 154 U. S. 134, 150 (1894); 1 GRr.z!LEA, EviDzE~c (12 ed. 1866) § 444.
Usually it is done for the purpose of refreshing or to clarify the witness' recollection. But
it must be noted that there is a very important distinction between using a prior incon-
sistent statement for the purpose of refreshing recollection and its use to impeach. When
used to impeach, the prior statement is proved in order to show that the testimony
given should be regarded as a nullity. The effect sought when the party is merely attempt-
ing to refresh recollection by questioning the witness as to prior inconsistent statements, Is
to have the witness himself recall what he has formerly stated to admit its truth and If
possible to explain away his apparent inconsistency.
It was the failure to recognize this distinction in two early English cases, Wright v.
Becker, 1 Moo. & Rob. 414, 174 Eng. Reprint 143 (1833) and Melhulsh v. Collier, 15
Q. B. 878, 117 Eng. Reprint 690 (1850), that has led many of our courts into the error
of making exceptions to some of the most fundamental rules of evidence, on the ground
of "surprise." See Putnam v. United States, 162 U. S. 687, 703 (1896), criticizing Bullard
v. Pearsall, 53 N. Y. 230 (1873) on this ground. As a matter of fact the right to
"refresh the memory of the witness" exists independent of surprise. Putnam v. United
States, 162 U. S. 687 (1896); London Guarantee and Ace, Co. v. Woelfle, 83 F. (2d) 325,
334 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936); Ellicot v. Pearl, 10 Pet. 412 (1836); Sneed v. United States,
298 Fed. 911, 914 (1924); People v. Minsky, 227 N. Y. 94, 124 N. E. 126 (1919); 17 &
18 Vict. C. 125 § 22 (1854); Txx. ANN. CODE CIMx. PROC. (Vernon, 1926) art. 732.
7. People v. Di Martini, 213 N. Y. 203, 107 N. E. 501 (1914); Hurley v. State, 46
Ohio St. 320, 21 N. E. 645 (1889).
8. Selover v. Bryant, 54 Minn. 434, 56 N. W. 58 (1893); cf., Fox v. Forty Four
Cigar Co., 90 N. J. L. 483, 101 Atl. 184 (1917) (the court takes the stand that using prior
inconsistent statements is not impeaching a witness, but rather contradicting him and It
was admissible to show what he said was untrue). Quaere: whether this admission of
proof of something the witness has formerly said does not operate as proof of the material
fact, which the witness now swears to be otherwise? If his prior statement is to be
proved by another witness as in Adams v. Wheeler, 97 Mass. 67 (1867) it is clearly
"hearsay evidence". (1936) 15 Tex. L. Rev. 132-3 citing: State v. Gargano, 99 Conn.
103, 121 Atl. 657 (1923); State v. Bassone, 109 N. J. L. 176, 160 AtI. 391 (1932) ; 6 JoNEs,
EvmDENcz, § 905; but cf. n. 6 supra.
9. 15 Q. B. 878 (1850).
10. 17 & 18 Vict. C. 125 § 22 (1854). It was also required that a proper foundation be
laid for its admission.
11. Other reasons have been given, such as, that a party vouches for the credibility of
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party is permitted to introduce proof that his opponent's witnesses have made prior
inconsistent statements without hindrance from this fear, why then, should he not
be permitted to introduce prior inconsistent statements made by his own witness?12
Why could not the evidence be admitted with judicial instructions placing limitations
on the right of the jury to consider it?
Yet it may be answered that when a party is dealing with his own %itness, the
situation is not the same. In the first place it is not necessary, then, for him to put
the testimony before the jury. Generally speaking a party must allow his adver-
sary's witness to speak his piece, even though he knows in advance how damaging
that witness' testimony will be. Because this is true, the court will allow the wide
latitude permitted on cross examination. In doing this the court does not mean
to permit a prior inconsistent statement to go as proof of the material fact, but
solely for the purpose of casting doubt upon the credibility of the witness and neu-
tralizing the effect of his damaging testimony. Of course, when the party knows in
advance that his witness will be adverse the best way to nullify his testimony is
simply not to place him on the stand.
When a party produces a witness innocently, in the belief that he will testify
as he has formerly stated and is suddenly confronted with a contrary statement the
situation is different. It is only fair then that the party be given as wide latitude
in the examination of his witness as he would have, had the witness been produced
by his opponent. But here also the purpose of admitting any prior inconsistent
statement is to cast doubt upon the credibility of the witness. His testimony ought
never to be regarded as substantive and careful instructions should be given to the
jury as to their limitations in considering it.13
So it seems that the court in the instant case is quite sound in deciding that when
the government permitted itself to be entrapped, and then sought to have the court
admit evidence which would not only free it from its predicament, but be the
basis for a verdict in its favor, the rule must be against it.14
his witness' statements. This is of course no more true than the argument that a party
producing a witness always vouches for the good character of the witness.
12. When the actual testimony is not prejudicial to the party, proof of prior incon-
sistent statements is not admissible even though the party is actually surprsed. Hic:ory
v. United States, 151 U. S. 303, 30S (1894). Nor is it admisble when the witnes3 has
merely failed to render the full co-operation anticipated. Kuhn v. United States, 24 F.
(2d) 910 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928). Nor where the party has unduly delayed in asserting
"surprise". Royal Insurance Co. v. Eastham, 71 F. (2d) 385, 388 (C. C. A. Sth, 1938).
13 "The maximum legitimate effect of impeaching testimony can never be more than
the cancellation of the adverse answer by which the party is surprised." Kuhn v. United
States, 24 F. (2d) 910 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928).
A party may not as a matter of right have such statements put before the jury from
which they may draw an inference as to the facts, and if the other evidence is not sufficent
the court may direct a verdict. N. Y. Life Insurance Co. v. Bacalis, 94 F. (2d) 200
(C. C. A. Sth, 1938).
14. A study of the statute recently enacted on this topic by the New York Legislature
(see n. 4 supra) seems to indicate that even under it, the statements will be admitted
only after surprise and only for the purpose of nullifying the witness. The law was
passed in response to sponsors who argued that "counsel is often taken by surprEe" by
the testimony of his witness. Again the remedy is in addition to the method of im-
peachment "now permitted by law." But as the notion of impmachment implies
merely nullification of a witness and as the best means of nullifying a witness, kLnown
to be adverse, is to keep him off the stand, unless an attorney is really surpri-ed, he
should not be permitted to avail himself of the statute.
1938]
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NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF VENDOR TO VENDEE IN THE SALE OF ARTICLES POTEN-
TIALLY DANGEROUS.--Defendant, a vendor of various electrical appliances, sold
plaintiff an electric washing machine with wringer attachment. The wringer was
equipped with a safety device which, unknown to the parties concerned, had been
faultily constructed. Plaintiff's hand was injured by the subsequent failure of the
device to function. Plaintiff sued in trespass for the injuries resulting from defend-
ant's negligence in representing the machine as free from defects, and in failing
to inspect the machine before sale. On appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, based
upon a jury's verdict, held, first, negligent misrepresentation, had been shown, and
second, the defendant, as vendor of a machine which would be dangerous if faultily
constructed, had assumed the duty to inspect and was under a duty to inspect
it for defects before selling it. Judgment affirmed, one judge dissenting. Ebbert
v. Phila. Electric Co., 298 AtI. 323 (Penn. Sup. Ct., 1938).
The attempt to fashion a single standard of liability for both manufacturers and
subsequent vendors in regulating their duties to their immediate vendees and to
third persons with whom they are not in privity has never been more than partially
successful.2 In this respect, liability for negligence resulting in injury to vendees
or third persons is no exception. Thus, although both the remote manufacturers and
the immediate vendor can be held liable for affirmative negligence in the making,
handling, etc., of the articles of their business,3 a double set of rules applies to their
negligent omissions to inspect those articles for defects. 4 This is true particularly
in the case of articles inherently dangerous.5 In such case the manufacturer is
liable to all, vendees and third persons, for injuries occasioned by his dangerous
instrumentality, if he has neglected to inspect it.0 The vendor of such article, how-
ever, is not burdened with the same liability. Subject to certain exceptions, the
vendor of a potentially dangerous article is under no duty to inspect it before trans-
ferring it to the vendee. 7 The reasons for this are obvious: A vendee who pur-
I. The instant decision will not be considered in this discussion insofar as it Is based
upon the point of negligent misrepresentation. However, for discussions of the effect
of the decision in the lower court [126 Pa. Sup. 351, 191 At. 384 (1937)], which this
decision affirmed, on the rules governing negligent misrepresentation in the courts of
Pennsylvania, see 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 107 (1937), and 4 U. of Pittsburgh L. Rev. 82 (1937).
2. 1 WIr.xsToN, SALEs (2d ed. 1924) § 233; VoLD SALES (1931) § 146 (a); Note (1937)
37 Col. L. Rev. 382.
3. Employers' Liability Corp. v. Columbus McKinnon Chain Co., 13 F. (2d) 128 (W. D.
N. Y. 1926) (manufacturers); Favo v. Remington Arms Corp., 67 App. Div. 414, 73
N. Y. Supp. 788 (3d Dep't 1901) (manufacturers); Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269,
128 At. 186 (1925) (manufacturer); Hasbrouck v. Armour, 139 Wis. 357, 121 N. W. 157
(1909) (manufacturer and vendor interpleaded).
4. Peaslee-Gaulbert Co. v. McMath, 148 Ky. Z65, 274, 276, 146 S. W. 770 (1912)
(vendor); Simons v. Sun Ray Water Co., 162 N. Y. Supp. 968 (1917) (vendor); Miller
v. Steinfeld, 174 App. Div. 337, 160 N. Y. Supp. 800 (3d Dep't 1916) (manufacturer).
5. The definition of the phrase "inherently dangerous" varies from "necessarily and
naturally dangerous" to "potentially dangerous". The instant case opines that every ma-
chine which is electrically driven should be considered inherently dangerous (page 326).
For an excellent discussion of this phrase, see McPherson v. Btjick Motor Co., 217 N. Y.
382, 387 et seq. (1916).
6. Heckel v. Ford Motor Co., 101 N. J. L. 385, 128 AtI. 242 (1925); McPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916); Stultz v. Benson Lumber Co.,
49 F. (2d) 848 (Cal. App. 1935).
7. Gould v. Slater Woolen Co., 147 Mass. 315, 17 N. E. 531 (1888); Hasbrouck v.
Armour & Co., 139 Wis. 357, 121 N. W. 157 (1904); Miller v. Senson, 189 II. App. 355,
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chases an article, knowing it was manufactured by a person other than the vendor,
and relying on the reputation of that manufacturer, certainly cannot impose a tort
liability on the vendor, for any defect in the article occasioned by the manufacturer's
negligence s Again, a vendor ignorant of a defect and unfamiliar with the process of
manufacture of the article would not suspect any risk in delivering it to another,
and his action in doing so would not be unreasonably careless. The exceptions to
this rule can be grouped into three general classes: First, where the vendor has
expressly or impliedly9 obligated himself to perform such inspection;1 0 second,
where the vendor, because of special knowledge of or previous experience vith
the articles, should know that they are dangerous for use;"' and third, where the
vendor, by reason of having changed, installed, stored or worked on the articles
in question, or represented himself as their manufacturer, has stepped over into
the manufacturer's field, and accepted his liability.2
Grounded as the general rule is on vague and generalized principles of negligence,
its boundaries are naturally difficult to define, and there have been cases which
seem to have disregarded the rule,13 in favor of a more stringent check on vendors.
But by far the great majority of cases, in New York as well as in the country at
large, have accepted the double standard rule.14
It will readily be seen, then, how far beyond the warrant of satisfactory authority
7 N. C. C. A. 1073 (1914); Bruckel v. F. Milhau's & Sons, 116 App. Div. 832, 102 N. Y.
Supp. 395 (2d Dep't 1903); Miller v. Steinfeld, 174 App. Div. 337, 160 N. Y. Supp. SO
(3d Dep't 1916); Liedeker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 249 App. Div. 335, 292 N. Y. Supp.
(2d Dep't 1937); Simons v. Sun Ray Water Co., 162 N. Y. Supp. 963 (1917).
S. Peaslee-Gaulbert Co. v. McI Iath, 148 Ky. 265, 146 S. W. 770 (1912).
9. The distinction, often overlooked in discussions of cases of this character, must b.
constantly kept in mind, between the obligations expressly or implidly asumed by
vendors as governed by the laws of negligence, which ve are considering here, and the
obligations (express and implied) which are forced upon vendors by Ui.iror= S.uLEs Acr
(1911) §§ 15, 16, but which we are not considering here. Of cours, plaintiff, if she
had so desired, could have included in her complaint a cause of action based on the
above-mentioned sections of the Sales Act, together with her cause in negligence. It has
been held that Section 69 (2) of the Act (governing the vendee's selection of remedies)
does not preclude the combination of the two. Friedman v. Swift Packing Co., 18 F.
Supp. 596 (S. D. N. Y. 1937). This case was favorably commented upon in Llewellyn,
On Warranty of Quality, and Society II (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 341, 390.
10. U -oaR SALEs Acr (1911) § 15; Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N. Y.
3S8, 175 N. E. 105 (1931); Note (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 77.
11. Clarke v. Army & Navy Co-operative Society, 1 K. B. 155 (1903), Gerkin v.
Brown & S. Co., 177 Mich. 45, 143 N. W. 49; Restatement, Torts, § 402.
12. Cox v. Mason, 89 App. Div. 219, 85 N. Y. Supp. 973 (2nd Dep't. 1903); Heiniman
v. Barfield, 136 Ark. 456, 207 S. W. 58 (1918); King Hardman Co. v. Ennis, 39 Ga. App.
355, 147 S. E. 119 (1929); Restatement, Torts, § 401.
13. Cox v. Mason, 89 App. Div. 219, 85, N. Y. Supp. 973 (2d Dep't 1903); Garvey v.
Namm, 136 App. Div. 815, 121 N. Y. Supp. 442 (2d Dep't 1910). But both of these cases
can be considered as coming under two of the exceptions to the general rule. In Cox v.
Mason, the vendor installed the article and his installation may have been faulty. Garvey
v. Namm, which the prevailing opinion cites as a case in point, seems to have been decided
on the assumption that the vendor had represented himself as the manufacturer of the
articles in question, even though such assumption is nowhere expressly stated.
14. For a comprehensive list of such cases, see 13 A. L. R. 1184, el seq. (1921). See
note 7, supm.
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the present decision goes.15 It is not alleged that the vendor worked on the article,
to make him liable under the third exception,' 0 nor that he had any special knowl-
edge of or previous experience with its faulty character which would make him
as a reasonable man foresee a risk to the plaintiff, and so be brought within the
second exception. But the majority opinion holds that he has impliedly obligated
himself to make the inspection because he employed service men,-and thus the
case seems to be brought by the court within the first exception.
The prevailing opinion contends that the defendant assumed the duty to inspect.
The basis for the inference that defendant promised to inspect is found in the
fact that defendant employed service men whose salaries obviously were paid from
the retailer's mark-up price charged the vendee. The vendor, says the court, impliedly
promised to use those service men for the protection of the vendee by having them
inspect all machines before sale. But unless the vendor represented to the vendee
that he would inspect and the vendee relied upon the representation, how can
he be bound to inspect? Here, there was no such representation, and the vendee's
only natural reliance was on the manufacturer. The court's intimation that the
vendee was paying for such inspection in his purchase price might well be met
with the claim that such a charge would be applied to the expense of the service men
for repairing the machines after sale. When there is no duty to inspect imposed by
the law of negligence on the vendor it cannot be said that he can assume the
duty merely by hiring potential inspectors. In effect then, the prevailing opinion
seems to extend the responsibility of vendors to liability for careful inspection
of all machinery 17 sold out of the "original package".' 8 It does this by placing the
ratio decidendi on the opportunity, rather than the duty, to inspect. This seems
at variance with the basic concepts of negligence. 10
15. As precedent for its startling decision, the majority opinion cites but four cases:
King Hardware Co. v. Ennis, 39 Ga. App. 355, 147 S. E. 119 (1929); Moore v. Jefferson
Distilling Co.; 12 La. App. 405, 123 So. 384 (1929); Garvey v. Namm, 136 App. Div. 815,
121 N. Y. Supp. 442 (2d Dep't 1910); Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Co., 267 Mass. 501,
167 N. E. 235 (1929). Of these, the King Hardware case was decided on the ground of negli-
gent misrepresentation, rather than simple negligence in failing to inspect. Moore v.
Jefferson Co. was reversed on appeal, 169 La. 1156, 126 So. 691 (1930). Garvey v. Namm
is probably not in point (see note 14). In the Guinan case, the vendor-defendant negli-
gently wrapped the article, so that it caught fire; that constitutes affirmative negligence,
which is not at issue in this case.
16. The court, however, intimates that the demonstration of the washing-machine by
defendant's salesman was such a "working" on the article as would lay on defendant the
duty to inspect. This would bring the case within the third exception, if true. However,
it would seem to be stretching the meaning of the word "demonstration" to bring it under
the classification of actual handling. A demonstration of an article is generally not, as this
court thinks, intended to test how the machine works, but to show hoaw t work the
machine. The buyer is still relying on the manufacturer's trade name as his guaranty of
fitness.
17. It may be noted here that food and drugs are subject to a more stringent rule in
this regard than articles of less perishable nature. Ward v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 231
Mass. 90, 120 N. E. 225 (1918) (canned beans); Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255
N. Y. 388, 175 N. E. 105 (1931) (bread); Perkins, Unwholesome Food as a Source of Lia-
bility (1919) 51 IowA L. BuL. 6.
18. The so-called "original package" rule is, however, not inflexible. If from past experi-
ence or special training with articles of the same sort, the vendor ought to know of defects,
he is liable even though the article is sold in a sealed carton. Gerkin v. Brown, 177
Mich. 45, 143 N. W. 48 (1913).
19. Restatement, Torts, § 282.
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The decision also imposes a burden on all business, by necessitating the wasteful
maintenance of a double inspection force, one at the plant and one at the store.
The dissenting opinion's position was wisely taken.
PARENT & CHm--LiALrrYz oF PAMNT TO CHILD IN PErso.,AL Lziutn AcnoN .--
Plaintiff's father negligently backed his truck over the plaintiff, a minor, causing
him serious injuries. Action was brought against the parent by the plaintiff's
cousin, who was appointed his guardian. On appeal from an order granting the
defendent's motion for judgment in his favor, held, exceptions overruled. An
unemancipated minor child can not maintain an action against his parent for personal
injuries caused by the negligence of the parent. Luster v. Luster, 13 N. E. (2d)
438 (Mass. 1938).
There has been no English decision on the question of the liability of a parent
for a negligent personal injury to his minor child.' However, English authorities
about 1870 seemed unanimous in the opinion that a child could recover for inten-
tional wrongs, such as assault and defamation.2 American writers of the nineteenth
century, prior to 1891, were not in accord as to whether the child should have an
action for any personal injuries where a parent was concerned.3 Before 1891, deci-
sions in the United States, seemed to lean towards allowing the child some civil
rights for personal torts against a person standing in loco parcidis, whether the
harm was intentional or negligent.4 However, in the leading United States case of
Hewellette v. George,5 in 1891, where the tort was intentional the child was denied
the right to sue the parent on the ground that it was against public policy, and in
Small v. Morriso 6 the same rule was adopted where the tort was a negligent harm.
These cases were followed by others all in accord with rules laid down in the
Hewellette case7 and in the Small case.8  The general weight of authority then
1. See Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, 584, 118 S. E. 12, 18, (1923); Dunlap v.
Dunlap, 84 N. H. 354, 357, 150 AUt. 905, 907 (1930). But see EVERsLEv, Do,.rnrc RLA-
i-o-s (1835) 601; BEvaNs, NroraaGcE (4th ed.) 232.
2. ADDISON, TORTS (1860) 423; PoLLAcr,, TORTS (13S7) 107; CLEnn AnD INuL
ToRTS (18S9) 152; RrEEs, Do.isc RE.,onoNs (3d ed. 1867) 421. See also Small v.
Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, 584, 118 S. E. 12, 18 (1923); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 354,
357, 150 At. 905, 907.
3. CooL=-, TORTS (1879) 171, says that on principle there seems to be no reason for
not allowing the action.
Scnou rx, Dom-rIc Rnrm.Anos (6th ed. 1921) § 275, would prohibit suits for payment
of wages promised and also for torts.
4. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations (1930) 43 HRuv. L. REv.
1030, 1061, 1062, (1929-1930) cites Fitzgerald v. Nol'thcote, 4 F. & F. 651 (1865); Gould
v. Christienson, Fed. Cos. No. 5, 636 (S. D. N. Y. 1836); Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859).
5. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, 13 L. R. A. 682 (1891).
6. Small v. Morrison, i85 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12, (1923).
7. Cases where the child was denied recovery for intentional injurie3 axe: Smith v.
Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N. E. 12S (1924); McKelvey v. McKelvey. 111 Tenn. 383,
77 S. W. 664 (1903); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
Several courts have held that an unemancipated minor child may maintain an action
against a person standing in loco parentis for malicious assault or cruel and inhuman
treatment. They are: Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N. E. 961 (1901);
DLx v. Martin, 171 Mo. App. 266, 127 S. W. 133 (1913); Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278,
95 N. W. 640 (1903); Steber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366, 296 N. W. 173 (1925); Wick v.
Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787 (1927).
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has been in favor of refusing the child a cause of action where the parent is the
defendant. Thus the principle case is in line with established authority.
Although this is the first decision to this effect in Massachusetts, the result
was expected not only because it accords with precedent, but also because Massachu-
setts still clings to rather outmoded concepts of family law, for example in denying
a wife a right of action against her husband for bodily injuries.9 But when one
considers that the rule of the instant case obtains even in states where a wife
is permitted such an action,' 0 the situation raises a query as to its soundness.
Those who believe that the child should not be allowed an action point out that
from ancient times it has been held that the family constitutes the basic unit of
society. The law has always aimed to maintain family integrity, and to preserve
domestic peace and tranquility."1 It is said that actions by the child against the
parent militate against this purpose of the law. They tend to alienate the members
of the domestic unit.' 2 During the minority of the child, any possible claims which
he might have would have to be investigated, often by outsiders whose intrusions
would stir up dissension.'3
While it is easy to agree with the thesis that the family is the basic unit of
society, it may be noted that after the child has received personal injuries caused
by the parent, particularly if they are serious, there is not much domestic peace
to be preserved.' 4 Domestic tranquility does not concern the courts in other
related fields. A child has a right to sue his parent for his property, if misused, 15
or on a contract,' 6 which law suits are as disruptive of family harmony as those
8. Cases where child was denied Yecovery for unintentional injuries are: Mesite v.
Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 AtI. 753 (1929); Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211 N. W.
88 (1926); Beleson v. Skilbeck, 185 Minn. 537, 242 N. W. 1 (1932); Reingold v. Reingold,
115 N. J. L. 532, 181 Atl. 153 (1935); Ciani v. Ciani, 127 Misc. 304, 215 N. Y. Supp. 767
(Sup. Ct. 1926); Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N. Y. 626, 162 N. E. 551 (1928); Kelly
v. Kelly, 158 S. C. 517, 155 S. E. 888 (1930). The writer has found only one case
squarely recognizing a cause of action against the parent by a mino child, and this was
decided in Canada. The harm in this case was an unintentional one. Fidelity & Casualty
Co. v. Marchand, 4 D. L. R. 157 (Can. 1924).
However, a different result may be reached where the child was emancipated. Crosby
v. Crosby, 230 App. Div. 651, 246 N. Y. Supp. 384 (1st Dep't 1930) held that a mother
could sue an emancipated child for negligence. It would seem that the courts, to be con-
sistent, would have to allow also an emancipated child to sue its parent.
9. MAss. GEN. STAT. (1932) c. 209, § 6.
10. E.g. New York, Rhode Island, New Jersey, New Hampshire and North Carolina.
11. Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, 887 (1891); Small v. Morrison, 185
N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12, 13 (1923); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787 (1927).
12. The desire of the law to avoid this, is said to be evidenced by the fact that some
states still deny the wife actions at law against her husband. The Massachusetts court
in the instant case points out that the reason "would seem to lie in views of public policy
equally applicable as between parent and minor child."
13. Luster v. Luster, 13 N. E. (2d) 438, 439 (Mass. 1938).--The only other alternative,
it is said, would be to withhold the prosecution of such claims until the child reached
majority. By this time, however, witnesses would probably be difficult to obtain.
14. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HAtRv. L. Rav. 1030,
1074 (1929-30).
15. Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N. Y. 317, 41 N. E. 26 (1895).
16. In re Merchant's Estate, 53 Hun. 638, 6 N. Y. Supp. 875 (Sup. Ct. 1889); Hall
v. Hall, 43 N. H. 293.
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for bodily injuries.17 May it not be claimed that truly the rights of a child con-
cerning his person are of greater importance to him than his property rights?' s
An "intruder," a friend represents the child in actions against his parent on a
contract or for misuse of his property. He is in fact required by law in the
Surrogate's court as special guardian where infants interests are involved.10 There
seems to be no legal reason for distinguishing between guardians appointed by the
courts in these cases and in cases where the action is for personal injuries, as to
their effect on the family unit.
It is significant that in New York and many other states 0 a married woman
now "has a right of action against her husband for his wrongful or tortious acts
resulting to her in any personal injury."2' Certainly actions between husband and
wife are as disruptive of domestic tranquility as between parent and child.2 The
present trend of the courts appears to be towards allowing members of the family
unit causes of action against each other.
Another argument urged on behalf of the rule in the principal case is that the
parent must be privileged in rearing and disciplining his child and he should not
be impeded by threats of possible civil action.2 Granted that the parent must
have certain rights in rearing his child and that reasonable family discipline must
be permitted, it does not follow that the child's right to recover for personal in-
juries must be refused in all cases.2-4  The law should not allow the parent to
conceal himself behind a parent's immunity for injuries to his child for which
he would be liable if the victim were a child other than his own. To the claim
that the child is sufficiently protected by the criminal law,-s it may be said that
it would not be deemed enough as to any other wrong.203 Also the remedy of
monetary compensation is certainly important to the child, if he is disabled. It
would seem then that the child should certainly be allowed to sue in thoe cases where
the wrong is intentional.2 7 Moreover, when one considers purely negligent acts,
which are unintentional, the domestic tranquility here may often be as disturbed
as in the case of intentional harms. A careless father should not be excused on
the grounds that he is a father. The parent ought not be excused particularly where
17. Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 261, 212 N. W. 787, 788 (1927).
18. Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 261, 212 N. W. 787, 78S (1927).
19. N. V. SuRR. CT. Acr, §§ 173, 175, 179.
20. New York, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and North Carolina.
21. N. Y. LAws 1937, c. 669, amendment to N. Y. Domr. REu. Law (1909) § 57. For
discussion of the law see 6 FoRennAi L. Rxv. (1937) 493.
The New York cases denying the child the right to sue were both decided prior to the
passage of this law. Ciani v. Ciani, 127 Misc. 304, 215 N. Y. Supp. 767 (Sup. Ct. 1926);
Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N. Y. 626, 162 N. E. 551 (1928).
22. Dunlap v. Dunlap 84 N. H. 354, 356, 150 At!. 905, 906 (1930).
23. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 H/sy. L. RE%,., 1030,
1076 (1930).
24. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 354, 150 Atl. 905, 909, 910 (1930).
25. Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 704, 9 So. 885, 886 (1891); Materese v.
Materese, 47 R. I. 131, 131 At!. 198 (1925).
26. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 354, 150 At. 905 (1930).
27. Cf. Hewellette v. George, 68 Mliss. 703, 9 So. SSS (1891), with Roller v. Roller,
185 N. C. 577, 178 S. E. 12 (1923), holding that a father is not liable civilly to his minor
daughter for rape.
The two New York cases were concerned with unintentional injuries caused by the
parent. Possibly the Court of Appeals will distinguish between them and an action by
the child for intentional injuries, if the case comes up.
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it appears probable that the future welfare of the child can only be protected by
recovery from the careless parent and putting the sum aside for the child's care.
A curious problem arises where an insurer of a parent seeks to avoid liability by
claiming that there is danger of a fraud if the child be permitted civil actions
against the father. The danger of collusion would be reason for carefully exam-
ining the cases which come up.28 A trust fund could be set up for the child
consisting of the darmages recovered, until the child is emancipated or reaches
majority, so as to prevent the parent from gaining as a result of his own misdeeds. 0
Furthermore, the danger of collusion may be diminished by a statutory provision
similar to that recently added to the Insurance Law when the wife was granted
a right of action for personal injuries against her husband. 80 It was provided that
policies must be extended in writing to include the insured's family, before courts
will allow recovery on the basis of the new right granted to the wife.
REAL PROPERTY-AFFIRmATIVE COVENANTS-ENFORCEMENT AGAINST GRANTEES OF
COVENANTOR.-The defendant's predecessor ifi title had for himself and his suc-
cessors in interest covenanted with his grantor that the land in question should be
subject to the payment of a stated yearly sum of money. This sum, which was
to be a lien on the land until paid, was to be devoted to public purposes in the
neighborhood by the grantor or its assignees. It was agreed between the parties
that this covenant, which was limited in its duration to twenty-three years, was
to run with the land. An action was brought by the plaintiff, as assignee of the
grantor, to foreclose the lien claimed to be created by the covenant, against the
defendant, who purchased the land subject to the covenant. On appeal from a
judgment on the pleadings for the plaintiff' held, the covenant ran with the land and
is enforceable by the plaintiff.' Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Ind.
Savings Bank, 278 N. Y. 248, 15 N. E. (2d) 793 (1938).
The difficulties which courts have always encountered in the subject of covenants
running with the land are sharply accentuated when the covenant involved calls
for the doing of an affirmative act. The English courts have steadfastly adhered
to their policy of non-enforcement of affirmative covenants, by refusing to let the
burden of the covenant run with the land.2 But most American courts have
rejected the consistent rigidity of the English rule, and as a consequence flounder
helplessly in a welter of divergent authority.3 New York more than any other
28. See (1933) 33 COL. L. Rxv. 360, 361; also (1931) 16 CoRN. L. REiv. 386, 390.
29. See (1931) 16 CORN. L. REv. 386, 390.
30. N. Y. LAWS OF 1937, c. 669, adding subd. 3a to § 109 of the Insurance Law. See
(1937) 6 FoRDAm L. REv. 496.
1. In holding that the covenant was enforcible by the plaintiff Property Owners' Asso-
ciation, the court chose to disregard the corporate entity of the plaintiff and to view it
as a group of individual pioperty owners who were bringing this action in furtherance
of their common interests. In so doing it carefully left open the question whether
covenants in a deed will be enforced on equitable principles against subsequent purchasers
with notice, at the suit of a party without privity of contract or estate. This aspect of
the court's decision will not be discussed.
2. Austerberry v. Oldham Corp., 29 Ch. D. 750 (1884); E. & G. C., Ltd. v. Bate,
79 L. J. 203 (K. B. 1935); cf. Spencer's Case, 5 Coke 16a, 77 Eng. Reprints 72 (K. B. 1583).
3. A recent compilation of forty-two afftmative covenant cases decided within the past
ten years gives some interesting figures on the conflict in the American cases: twenty-one
cases enforced the covenants, nineteen refused to enforce them, and two agreed In dicta
that they were enforceable. See Note (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 821.
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state has adhered to the pattern of the English rule, and but twenty-five years ago
bluntly refused to sanction the running of any affirmative covenants, with stated
exceptions, 4 none of which contemplated the positive act of paying money for
use in connection with land. With the present case, it appears that a new class
of exceptions is created.
More than any other of the so-called "essentials" of enforceable real covenants,5
the centuries-old requirement that the covenant must "touch" or "concern" the
land6 has provoked confusion. In the instant case the court's decision to test
the covenant in this respect by its effect on the legal relations of the parties,7
rather than by the hypertechnical distinctions so often employed,s has the merit
of using a realistic and practical approach to arrive at a just result. Yet the vague-
ness and generality of the rule so formulated lessens its workability as a standard
of comparison, for it will not always be easy to say whether a given covenant
substanstiaily alters the rights of the parties flowing from the ownership of the
land. But assuming the desirability of enforcing a covenant such as is here in-
volved, it is dear that the New York attitude toward affirmative covenants has been
considerably revised for the better, as was inevitable. It is to be remembered that
heretofore courts in this jurisdiction have been overly hesitant about requiring
the owner of land to perform positive acts in relation thereto,0 and even party wall
4. See Miller v. Clary, 210 N. Y. 127, 132, 134, 103 N. E. 1114, 1116 (1913). The
court conceded the necessity for some flexibility in the rule, and listed as exceptions affirm-
ative covenants relating to party walls (but see note.10, infra) and the building of fences
along boundaries, to provide railroad crossings, to repair private ways, and covenants in
leases. The New York rule is discussed at some length in Friedman, The Scopc of Mert-
gage Liens on Fixtures and Personal Property in New York, p. 360 n. 131, supra.
5. Dean Clark lists the essential characteristics, aside from the form of the covenant,
as follows: (1) the parties must intend that the covenant should run with the land;
(2) it must touch or concern the land with which it runs; and (3) there must be privity
of estate between the promisee or party claiming the benefit of the covenant and the
right to enforce it, and the promisor or party who rests under the burden of the covenant.
CL=a, R14L CovrM_;Asrs AND Ormm INxansrs Wmc1 "Rrr w=m LiamD" (1929) 74. It
has been suggested that "privity of estate" in the last requirement be done away with,
as meaningless and confusing. WAlsm, LAW OF PRoParTY (2d ed. 1927) 63S.
6. Spencer's Case, 5 Coke 16a, 77 Eng. Reprints 72 (K. B. 1583). It has been sug-
gested that it would be more accurate to say that the covenant touched and concerned
the ownership of land, ratheIr than the land itself. Gavit, Covenants Running wilh the
Land (1930) 24 IL. L. R-v. 786, 787. At any event, the courts' lack of accuracy in using
the phrase has caused much of the confusion. Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in
Leases (1914) 12 MicH. L. RLv. 639.
7. This test is suggested in CLAnx, op. cit. supra note 5, at 76.
S. E.g., Coulter v. Sausalito Bay Water Co., 122 Cal. App. 480, 10 P. (2d) 7S0 (1932)
(covenant must be strictly construed even though parties intend it to run); Poage v.
Quincy, 0. & K. C. R. R., 23 S. W. (2d) 221 (Mo. App. 1930) (applies equitable doctrine
that purchaser must have notice, although covenant was clearly enforceable at law) ; Epting
v. Lexington Water Power Co., 177 S. C. 303, 181 S. E. 66 (1936) (covenant by riprarian
owner to supply power does not "touch" or "concern" land); see (1936) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q.
Riv. 313.
9. Miller v. Clary, 210 N. Y. 127, 103 N. E. 1114 (1913); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Netw
Iork & Q. C. Ry., 253 N. Y. 190, 170 N. E. 8S7 (1930); Riverview fManor Ass'n v.
Bruckner, 170 App. Div. 918, 154 N. Y. Supp. 1142 (2d Dep't 1915), aff'd, 223 N. Y. 526,
119 N. E. 1074 (1918).
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agreements have not been treated too tenderly.10 That recent years have witnessed
some laudable liberalization 'of this view, both in the Court of Appeals11 and
the lower courts,' 2 cannot be denied, but such decisions were content to whittle
away at Miller v. Clary.13 A re-examination and restatement of the principles of
affirmative covenants was needed, and the instant case fulfills that need, though
it cannot, and does not pretend to, furnish a convenient rule of thumb to test
the enforceability of any given real covenant.
1 4
10. The liberal view on party wall agreements was supported in one of the earliest
cases. See Van Renssalaer v. Hays, 19 N. Y. 68, 91 (1859). But the court retrogressed
in Cole v. Hughes, 54 N. Y. 444 (1873), and held such a covenant to be merely personal.
The rule was again extended in Mott v. Oppenheimer, 135 N. Y. 312, 31 N. E. 1097
(1892), to permit the covenant to run, and the cases are reviewed and distinguished at
painstaking length in Sebald v. Mulholland, 155 N. Y. 455, 50 N. E. 260 (1898). For a
criticism of the New York rule see Clark, Party Wall Agreements as Real Covenants (1924)
37 HARv. L. Rnv. 301, 317.
11. Morgan Lake Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 262 N. Y. 234, 186 N. E. 685
(1933) (covenant to pay for any damage done to ice in lake enforced against covenantor's
successor in interest).
12. Especially Lawrence Park Realty Co. v. Crichton, 218 App. Div. 374, 218 N. Y.
Supp. 278 (2d Dep't 1926); Kenilwood Owners' Corp. v. Jaybro Realty & Devel. Co.,
156 Misc. 604, 281 N. Y. Supp. 541 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
13. 210 N. Y. 127, 103 N. E. 1114 (1913); see note 4, supra.
14. For example, a perpetual covenant to pay an unlimited sum of money for use In
connection with land would seem enforceable under the text here. However, it is doubtful
whether a coult would enforce the running of such a covenant in an extreme case-e.g.,
where the land is sought to be charged with an exorbitant sum to be expended for
improvements. In such a case it would seem that a realistic approach coupled with the
policy of fostering the alienability of land would impel the court to refuse enforcement.
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